Big Business and Foreign Policy: the Case of Oligarchs in Ukraine by Troost, Marius
Big Business and Foreign Policy: 
the Case of Oligarchs in Ukraine

Marius Troost (s1899805)

29-01-2018

MA International Relations

Supervisor: Dr. Karen Smith 

Word count: 14.760



Table of contents 
1. Introduction and theory	 3

1.1 Introduction	 3

1.2 Research question	 3

1.3 Research design	 4

1.4 Analytical framework: International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis	 5

1.5 Business elites and foreign policy making	 7

1.6 Neopatrimonial democracy	 8

2. Oligarchs in Ukraine	 10

2.1 Who are the oligarchs and what do they mean in Ukraine?	 10

2.2 Business interests	 13

2.2.1 Rinat Akhmetov	 13

2.2.2 Viktor Pinchuk	 14

2.2.3 Ihor Kolomoisky	 14

3. Oligarchs and the EU Association process	 16

3.1 What is the Association Agreement?	 16

3.2 Attitudes towards EU integration	 17

3.3 Oligarchs in Brussels and Davos	 18

3.4 Lobbying the Association Agreement	 20

4. Oligarchs and the conflicts in Crimea and in Eastern Ukraine	 23

4.1 What happened in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine?	 23

4.2 Crimea	 24

4.3 Eastern Ukraine: Institutionalisation	 25

4.4 Eastern Ukraine: Private militias	 27

5. Conclusion and discussion	 30

6. Bibliography	 33
Marius Troost (s1899805)  2
1. Introduction and theory 
1.1 Introduction 
Ukraine, on the border between the European Union (EU) and the Russian Federation, is in the 
process of definitively positioning itself in the international arena, balancing between these two 
powers. In the past two decades, the pendulum has swung repeatedly from a pro-European 
outlook towards Russia and back, illustrating how the country is caught between these two 
powers and is still in the process of finding the right balance. Ukraine was incorporated in the 
European Union Eastern Partnership program in 2009 and has recently concluded an Association 
Agreement (AA) including a Deep and Comprehensive Trade Area (DCFTA) with the EU. At the 
same time, it is dealing with significant domestic and international challenges: The country is 
involved in a territorial conflict in Crimea and its eastern regions and its Soviet legacy still plays a 
role in its current political constellation. Corruption remains widespread and the role of business in 
politics is unmistakable. 

	 Business in Ukraine is represented in particular by a group of tycoons that control a 
significant part of the Ukrainian economy, the so-called oligarchs. Apart from dominating certain 
sectors of the economy, they own some of the main media and are able to influence the political 
agenda as well. In this context, scholars have described Ukraine’s political system as a 
neopatrimonial democracy - a system where alongside the formal political institutions, a system of 
informal networks and dealings exists, connected to elite rent seeking. What this means for the 
question of how to move on with Ukraine and how to deal with its peculiar political system is in 
turn what policymakers and leaders are now occupied with and what they are trying to 
comprehend when dealing with Ukraine in the international arena.

1.2 Research question 
This research project will focus on the role of oligarchs in shaping policy and, more specifically, on 
foreign policy. It will attempt to find out if oligarchs influence Ukraine’s course at the international 
level; do they play a role at all and if so, is this a consequence of the nature of Ukraine’s political 
system? The concrete question that will be answered is ‘To what extent has the position of 
oligarchs in Ukraine’s political system helped shape Ukrainian foreign policy at key moments in 
2010 - 2014?’ and for this purpose I will focus on the AA/DCFTA negotiations between Ukraine 
and the European Union and the conflict in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in 2014. By answering 
this question, a contribution will be made to the knowledge of how Ukraine functions politically 
and what role oligarchs play at the political level. This could in turn foster relevant knowledge for 
policy practitioners dealing with Ukraine at the domestic or international level. At the same time, it 
will make a contribution to the scholarly literature on the topic of the relation between business 
elites and foreign policy.
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1.3 Research design 
This project follows a case-study between-case design. The country of Ukraine functions as the 
case and within this case, two foreign policy events will be analysed. These events are the the AA/
DCFTA negotiations with the European Union that was eventually signed on June 27, 2014 and 
the conflict in Eastern Ukraine and in Crimea starting in early 2014. By comparing these two 
events relating to this one country, it increases validity and means that the results could be 
extended more reliably to other similar cases in order to say something about the relation 
between business elites and foreign policy there as well.

To give a faithful overview of how events developed and what role oligarchs played in 
them, I use a qualitative methodology using mixed sources. This approach allows one to integrate 
diﬀerent methods and sources, drawing on the strengths of each. In terms of sources, I rely on a 
broad set of diﬀerent ones from journalistic articles to elite interviews. The goal is to explore as 
many perspectives as possible as to avoid selection bias. The sources include quality 
newspapers in English and Russian language and policy reports from NGOs and experts on the 
subject. Additionally, in cases where oligarchs have clear policy preferences they have spoken out 
in public - enabling me to ascertain their interests and preferences on the basis of these 
statements. Subsequently, in order to verify if this position they took in public corresponds with 
their actions, more detailed analyses will be made of the behaviour of several key oligarchs. Third, 
as Ukraine has become a key area of interest for scholars and policy practitioners over the last 
few years, there is abundant secondary literature available on the subject. Finally, I have 
conducted elite interviews with actors who are knowledgeable about Ukrainian politics for the 
purpose of triangulation and verifying whether what I have found from other sources appears 
legitimate. These respondents have been selected through a process of snowball sampling, using 
my personal contacts to establish initial contact and then following up on these contacts. From 
the five interviews I have conducted, one has taken place face-to-face, one via an online video 
conference and three have sent me written responses to my questions. The interviews had a 
semi-structured character, with a number of questions and themes prepared in advance. Still, the 
questions were open ended and gave the respondents the opportunity to expand on certain 
topics if they desired to. Additionally there was room to deviate from the original questions if the 
situation called for it. By combining the diﬀerent kinds of data listed above, I strive to provide a 
truthful representation of the process of foreign policy formulation in Ukraine. 

One has to recognise, however, that the nature of the topic has made access to primary 
data on oligarchs a challenge, as dealings involving them are often back-door and consciously 
hidden from the public eye. Even though at some points oligarchs have spoken out, the general 
trend is that they remain in the background and prefer to avoid publicity where possible. At the 
same time the topic is politically sensitive, meaning that it is likely that some insiders are not 
willing to share everything they know. For this reason, the exact degree to which oligarchs have 
impacted policy making is in some cases not definitively verifiable and will require additional, 
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more comprehensive research. Hence, this project should be considered an exploratory study, 
investigating an avenue of research that would benefit from supplementary work.

1.4 Analytical framework: International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis 
In order to examine the role of oligarchs in influencing foreign policy, it is necessary to establish a 
theoretical framework on how foreign policy is shaped and what that means for International 
Relations (IR). For this purpose, in this section I will establish my own theoretical position within 
the framework of IR theory and Foreign Policy Analysis. In terms of foreign policy, throughout this 
piece this will also be used to refer to the war in Eastern Ukraine. Even though this is essentially 
an intra-state conflict, I believe the involvement of Russia and the international dimensions of the 
conflict in the context of international attempts at regulation do help it qualify as foreign policy. 

	 Analysis of the role of oligarchs or business elites in shaping foreign policy requires a 
specific approach to International Relations. Immediately, it becomes obvious that a neorealist 
perspective lacks in explanatory power if one suspects that oligarchs can have a decisive impact 
on determining foreign policy. Indeed, a neorealist would argue that the domestic political 
landscape is of marginal influence; state policy is simply shaped by the international environment 
it is located in. According to Kenneth Waltz, one of its main proponents, ‘it is the structure of the 
system that determines the way states interact’ (Waltz, 1979: 117). Similarly, John Mearsheimer’s 
now classic argument says that the anarchic nature of the international system forces states to 
keep wanting to increase their security at the expense of others (Mearsheimer, 2001: xiii). Again, 
the dominance of structural factors shaping the outcome of international relations is apparent.

	 This was the dominating realist view in the late 20th century anyway. Eventually, a number 
of scholars started arguing that a theory solely focusing on the system a state is located in does 
not suﬃce and some attention to the way a state’s preferences are formed is required. Since then, 
a number of realists have started to concede that there might be more to the development of 
state policy (primarily in the realm of security, being realists) than just structural factors. Recently, 
the school of neoclassical realism has been developing to account for the impact of domestic 
political considerations and to introduce the problem of state autonomy to security studies 
(Ripsman, 2012: 170). As Rose writes, who coined the term neoclassical realism, ‘it explicitly 
incorporates both external and internal variables, updating and systematising certain insights 
drawn from classical realist thought’ (Rose, 1998: 146). This perspective then, in contrast to 
neorealism, does leave room for domestic factors in determining state behaviour, including 
domestic elites. The problem remains, however, that the general notions of realism are still central: 
It maintains an exclusive focus on conflict and security and it sees these domestic factors 
exclusively as intervening variables, that still play only a secondary role in foreign policy. Another 
critique of the neoclassical realist argument asks how this theory can still be considered realist, 
when it in fact incorporates factors commonly associated with liberalism.

	 The argument made by renowned liberal Andrew Moravcsik follows the same line. Dealing 
with the question of the assumptions that neoclassical realism is based on, he writes: ‘the 
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incorporation of variation in underlying domestic preferences, we argue, undermines (if not 
eliminates) the theoretical distinctiveness of NCR as a form of realism by rendering it 
indistinguishable from nonrealist theories about domestic institutions, ideas, and interests’ (Legro 
and Moravcsik, 1999: 28). Indeed, Moravcsik himself has developed a liberal theory that deals 
with these factors. According to him, liberal theory sees the state as embedded in domestic and 
transnational society and sees its preferences as shaped by them (Moravcsik, 1997: 516). It is a 
bottom-up approach of politics, where policy results from societal preferences rather than be a 
consequence of inter-state strife. It doubts the realist assertion that states are unitary actors and 
in a normative sense, it is more optimistic about the possibilities for cooperation between states. 
Furthermore, it recognises the role of sub-state actors, transnational organisations, institutions 
and business for example (see Keohane & Nye, 2011: 20). 

	 A complementary research agenda within the field of International Relations that deals 
specifically with this question of domestic drivers for policy formulation and is still more specific 
than Moravcsik’s liberalism is Foreign Policy Analysis. FPA can be considered a subfield of 
International Relations, or something of an alternative agenda to the mainstream IR theories that 
developed in the 1950s. The core distinction was that where classic realism and liberalism treat 
the state as a ‘black box’, Foreign Policy Analysis focused on the processes shaping state 
behaviour at the domestic level (Kubalkova, 2015: 15). A useful dichotomy here is between 
‘international politics’ that deals with relations between states and ‘foreign policy’ that describes 
foreign policy formulation within the state. As summarised by Juliet Kaarbo, FPA focuses on 
explaining governments’ foreign policy decisions through specified factors at multiple levels of 
analysis (Kaarbo, 2015: 191). Special attention is paid here to the role on decision making of 
individuals and individuals acting in groups, something Valerie Hudson has called ‘actor-specific 
theory’ (Hudson, 2005: 2). So whereas theories of international politics are generally occupied 
with structural explanans for policy formulation, FPA concentrates especially on human agency. 
Just like within theories of international politics, within FPA there exist diﬀerent schools of 
thought. These schools in turn emphasise diﬀerent actors or institutions, that they believe have a 
decisive impact on the realisation of foreign policy. Here one can for example think about trade 
unions, epistemic communities or representatives of business. Still, according to Chris Alden and 
Amnon Aran, these approaches all have in common that they accept that foreign policy is 
produced and legitimised by the state apparatus, within which diﬀerent factions compete. The 
way it is thought how this competition plays out in turn diﬀerentiates the diﬀerent approaches 
(Alden & Aran, 2012: 48). A Marxist approach for example would argue that foreign policy usually 
caters to the interests of the dominant social class, whereas a focus on individual leaders accords 
them a special and decisive role in the process of foreign policy formulation (see Alden & Aran, 
2012: 50-57 & Breuning, 2007). In this research project, the role of business elites in the form of 
oligarchs is the central point of focus. For this reason, some attention will now be paid to the 
existing scholarship on the topic of business in the foreign policy making process.

Marius Troost (s1899805)  6
1.5 Business elites and foreign policy making 
In the field of FPA, substantial literature has emerged about the question which one of these 
groups it is that most eﬀectively manages to influence foreign policy. In this regard, the study by 
Lawrence Jacobs and Benjamin Page (2005) has become a seminal piece. To try to answer ‘who 
governs?’ in the context of foreign policy, they examine the influence of organised interest groups 
(split up in groups associated with labor and those connected to business), epistemic 
communities and public opinion on the final product of foreign policy in the United States. On the 
basis of their quantitative research, they conclude that internationally oriented business leaders 
exercise strong and consistent influence on U.S. foreign policy (Jacobs & Page, 2005: 120). In 
other words, rather than public opinion or foreign policy experts, decision makers follow the 
preferences of business. This confirms what has been shown earlier in qualitative studies, as has 
been conducted by Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994) for example: They argue that 
because of the financial support interest groups can oﬀer politicians, these groups are favoured 
by these politicians in the policy making process (Grossman & Helpman, 1994: 834). This 
favoured position in this case translates into trade policies that are in line with this groups’ 
interests. Logically, it follows that big business is the most likely to profit from this situation, as it 
generally has more financial means to dedicate to political contributions than do labor groups or 
epistemic communities. 

	 Still, these studies both only focus on the United States. It is quite possible that in other 
contexts, the dynamics between business and politics and the associated consequences for 
foreign policy is diﬀerent. This is what Peter Katzenstein argues when he compares the foreign 
economic policies in the United States and France. He begins by stating that the consistency and 
content of foreign economic policies result as much from the constraints of domestic structures 
as it does from international eﬀects (Katzenstein, 1976: 2). In turn, he views the domestic 
diﬀerences between the United States and France as ‘diﬀerent balances of state and 
society’ (Katzenstein, 1976: 15). Whereas in the latter, political power is concentrated strongly in 
the hands of the state, the other is based on a principle of social pluralism. Subsequently, this has 
consequences for the way private interests find their way into public policy: Katzenstein argues 
that in the United States, the engagement of business in policy making is encouraged, while 
France is led top-down and business has less influence (Katzenstein, 1976: 18). Following this 
reasoning, the degree of influence of business on foreign policy as suggested by Jacobs and 
Page and Grossman and Helpman might be diﬀerent for each country. 

	 Thomas Risse-Kappen makes a similar argument, focussing on the impact on foreign 
policy of public opinion rather than business. He writes that the policy impact of public opinion 
depends on the domestic structure and the coalition-building processes in a country (Risse-
Kappen, 1991: 479). Among these domestic structures, he counts ‘the basic features of society 
and the institutional and organisational arrangements linking state and society and channeling 
societal demands into the political system’ (Risse-Kappen, 1991: 484). The coalition-building on 
the other hand refers to the way interests are represented at the political level, linking the society 
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to the political (Risse-Kappen, 1991: 485). All in all, these theories can be classified by what Alden 
and Aran call ‘the domestic structures approach’. It contends that the most significant 
determinant of foreign policy is the structure of the state and the institutional mechanisms that 
translate societal demands into policy (Alden & Aran, 2012: 50). A certain regime’s institutional 
make up can foster slower or faster decision making, have abundant or sparse access points for 
societal actors to influence policy and can develop certain norms of behaviour. Furthermore, it 
takes regional patterns and local history into account. For example, a theory prominent in IR that 
is connected to this approach is the Democratic Peace Theory, constituting a body of literature 
that revolves around the expectation that democratic states are less likely to go to war that non-
democracies because of their particular institutional composition (Neack, 1995: 218-219).

	 What the above theories have in common, is that they all focus on foreign policy in 
consolidated, liberal democracies. Less scholarly work is available when it comes to states that 
are still in the process of democratising or that have stopped democratising somewhere along the 
way, leading to some type of hybrid system between a democracy and autocracy. For countries 
with these types of regimes, knowledge about the relationship between business and foreign 
policy would benefit from further research. Ukraine is a good example that reflects one of these 
democratising states, where its domestic structure consists of a peculiar system of state-society 
relations, with a significant role for business elites in the form of oligarchs. It is therefore that I 
intend to find out to what extent in Ukraine domestic structures shape the possibilities (defined as 
access points) for business elites to influence foreign policy. First, however, it is necessary to 
examine the type of political system that exists in Ukraine.

1.6 Neopatrimonial democracy 
As I have mentioned in the introduction, scholars have argued that the regime type in Ukraine can 
best be described as a neopatrimonial democracy. This concept originates in African Studies and 
has recently been adopted to describe political systems in Central Asia and Eastern Europe as 
well, including Ukraine. David Lewis describes it as ‘a political system in which the familiar 
institutions of the modern state (government ministries, a legal system, and a legislative body) are 
combined with informal, behind-the-scenes politicking based on patron–client relationships, 
regional networks, and kinship’ (Lewis, 2012: 116). The existence of a combination of both formal 
and informal elements is central in this kind of system. In a related sense, other central aspects 
are widespread corruption and the fact that power rests with those who can secure business 
opportunities for themselves and their allies. Writing in the context of Africa, Michael Bratton and 
Nicholas van de Walle summarise the three main dimensions of neopatrimonial rule as follows: 
Power concentration in the hands of patrons, systematic clientelism and particularistic use of 
state resources (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997: 63-68). This typology is in turn also used by others 
who have attempted to define neopatrimonialism (see von Soest, 2010: 11).

	 Increasingly, the concept has started to be applied to Ukraine. For example, Oleksandr 
Fisun (2010) states that Ukraine after 2004 can be described as a neopatrimonial democracy 
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because ‘political actors compete through electoral mechanisms, but their goals still focus on 
state capture as the primary gain’ (Fisun, 2010: 1). Second, Susan Stewart (2013) uses the 
concept of neopatrimonialism to examine how the existence of this system influences the process 
of domestic reform in Ukraine, specifically in the area of public procurement. She concludes that 
in 2010-2013 a neopatrimonial system had developed and this led to reform being slowed down 
by domestic actors (Stewart, 2013: 214). These actors pursue their own personal interests 
contrary to the national interest and when coalitions are formed, they are flexible and function on 
both formal and informal bases. Consequently, international institutions like the IMF and the World 
Bank could only influence the reform process up to a certain point, when it did not hurt these 
groups’ interests. Apart from the above-mentioned, other authors such as Malygina (2010) have 
used the concept in the context of Ukraine as well. Nevertheless, these authors limit their 
analyses mostly to the process of formulating policy on the national level and few scholars have 
paid attention to the consequences of its political system for Ukrainian foreign policy, as scholars 
of neopatrimonialism have in the case of African politics. One of the few exceptions is Mikhail 
Molchanov, who writes that because of the patrimonial character of its politics Ukraine ‘lacked a 
clear national strategy of foreign policy’ (Molchanov, 2016: 139). This corresponds roughly with 
what Lewis wrote in terms of neopatrimonial democracies in general, namely that ‘foreign policy 
alliances can shift rapidly in response to internal political events’ (Lewis, 2012: 116).

	 When it comes to the consequences of Ukraine’s domestic structures for foreign policy 
formulation, this is not very conclusive yet. On the basis of what has been written by the 
preceding authors, one can interpret the relation between business elites and politics as one that 
is characterised by informality, clientelism and personal interests. The state is rather weak and is 
susceptible to the demands of business elites, rather than public opinion. In Ukraine, a particular 
system appears to have emerged that has significant access points to policy making for business 
elites because of either personal connections or material resources, that are used to sway 
politicians their way. In comparison to a consolidated democracy, one can expect business 
leaders in Ukraine to have more access points to policy making and hence, more impact on 
foreign policy. This is in turn what I will be examining in the remainder of this piece. 
The rest of the thesis will proceed as follows: In chapter 2, a concise history will be 
provided of the phenomenon of the oligarchs in Ukraine from the collapse of the Soviet Union until 
now and the most prominent individuals will be introduced. In chapter 3, the role of the oligarchs 
in the concluding of the Association Agreement with the European Union will be discussed. 
Subsequently, in chapter 4 I will examine their impact in the 2014 conflicts in Crimea and Eastern 
Ukraine. Finally, in chapter 5 I will summarise my findings and reflect on my research. 
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2. Oligarchs in Ukraine 
2.1 Who are the oligarchs and what do they mean in Ukraine? 
Before examining more closely the role the oligarchs in question played in Ukraine during the 
2014 events, it will be required to devote some attention to who we are dealing with. Therefore, I 
will now give a concise overview of the history of oligarchs in Ukraine starting from the 1990s and 
leading up to 2014. The main individuals and their interests will be identified.

	 The first question that needs answering constitutes: ‘What is an oligarch?’. The word 
oligarch became an accepted label in Russia and Ukraine in the 1990s and means a very wealthy 
and politically well-connected businessperson (Aslund, 2007: 256). Taras Kuzio identifies the key 
feature of an oligarch to become monopolists in every field where they operate, whether it be 
media, business or politics (Kuzio, 2016: 181). Their wealth is usually accumulated in the chaotic 
period of privatisation that occurred in both countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union. They 
made thankful use of the underdevelopment of regulations and lack of supervision to buy up state 
assets through murky deals and became rich very rapidly. Using their wealth, they eventually 
became important players in the media sector as well and, perhaps more significantly, actively 
strived to gain political influence. Oligarchs have funded political campaigns, bought seats in 
parliament and set up front parties in order to influence election results. An illustrating 
consequence from the link between politics and business is that election campaigns in Ukraine 
are among the most expensive in the world and without substantial support, running a campaign 
is nearly impossible (Aslund, 2015: 121). 

	 The emergence of many of the oligarchs in the 1990s had its foundation already in the 
Soviet Union. Because of the economic stagnation in the 1970s and 1980s, a significant shadow 
economy had developed and this included participation by Soviet government oﬃcials and 
security forces (Kuzio, 2016: 183). After the collapse of the Union, it was relatively easy for these 
people to find each other again to continue their business, this time in a capitalist system. Other 
future oligarchs came up from nothing by being shrewd businessmen or through the use of force 
(Yekelchyk, 2015: 79). The most profitable business in post-Soviet Ukraine was the mediation in 
the gas trade between Russia and Ukraine: Because of a deal between the two countries to sell 
Ukraine gas at discounted prices, oligarchs with good connections could reroute the gas to 
Europe and sell it at market value, guaranteeing massive profits (ibid.). After the turn of the 
century, the now established oligarchs subsequently invested these funds in other businesses, in 
for example the metal and mineral sectors. 

	 In terms of the leading people involved, Kuzio identifies five groups of oligarchs in Ukraine: 
The Donetsk clan, the gas lobby and the dissident, liberal and ‘patriotic' oligarchs (Kuzio, 2015: 
387). I will use the classification made by Kuzio and complement this with information from other 
sources. It is worth noting here, however, that the labels are merely used for simplification 
purposes and to illustrate how the oligarchs are organised; they should not be considered a 
definitive classification and there is a significant number of less prominent oligarchs in Ukraine 
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that are not included in Kuzio’s categorisation. In the table below, these groups and the 
individuals and businesses involved are listed. It shows how the diﬀerent groups often have their 
origin in one of Ukraine’s major cities: Kiev (whose oligarchs were important during the 1990s but 
have lost much of their influence and are hence not listed), Donetsk and Dnipro. These groups of 
oligarchs have known each other because of personal ties, often share the same interests and act 
relatively single-mindedly. Especially the Donetsk clan has remained a tight political bloc with 
significant political influence. 

	 Generally speaking, there is a number of ways through which oligarchs can attempt to 
influence policy and defend their interests in the Ukrainian political system, as identified by Heiko 
Pleines (2016). These take the forms of informal networks, formal political procedures and they 
can exert influence through the media and their material means. In the context of informal 
networks, the regional networks noted in the table below play an important role. For example, 
former president Viktor Yanukovich himself was part of the Donetsk network and knew oligarch 
Rinat Akhmetov and the others associated with them very well at a personal level and this 
eventually translated into their shared membership of the Party of Regions. In turn, where 
Akhmetov supported Yanukovich during his political projects, Yanukovich returned the favour by 
giving Akhmetov priority in trade and procurement deals (Kuzio, 2016: 191). Additionally, informal 
networks can also be based on personal relationships or on kinship, which corresponds to the 
description of the neopatrimonial democracy mentioned in the previous chapter. Furthermore, an 
interesting characteristic of informal networks is that they can persist over time, enduring under 
diﬀerent governments. Pleines shows for example how the group of most prominent oligarchs 
hardly changed with the transition to the (progressive minded) Orange government: Someone like 
Dmitro Firtash maintained his highly influential position as monopolist in the gas trading business 
under the new government (Pleines, 2016: 117).

	 Additionally, a great number of oligarchs have themselves assumed formal oﬃce in politics 
in order to defend their interests. Out of the 29 oligarchs mentioned in Pleines’ research, only 
three never held any formal political oﬃce, illustrating the prevalence of oligarchs in politics 
(Pleines, 2016: 120). The assuming of political oﬃce by oligarchs is also facilitated by the corrupt 
nature of the Ukrainian political system: According to an article in Der Spiegel, a seat in the 
Ukrainian parliament could be bought for 3 to 10 million dollars, which is small change for an 
oligarch (Bidder, 2015). This practice of selling positions on party lists continued up to the most 
recent parliamentary elections, as is reported by the European Council for Foreign Relations 
(Wilson, 2016: 6). After having secured a seat, an oligarch can go on to vote for bills that suit his 
business interests. Apart from this, instances have also taken place where oligarchs have created 
new political parties to skew the election results in ways that would benefit them. This happened 
in the 2000 Kuchma campaign for reelection for example (Pleines, 2016: 120). Finally, oligarchs 
can influence parliamentary votes through proxies who will do their bidding for them, or by bribing 
parliamentarians. 
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	 Another way oligarchs exert power and promote their interests is through media. The 
majority of television are owned by media enterprises belonging to one of the oligarchs, namely 
Rinat Akhmetov, Ihor Kolomoiskiy and Viktor Pinchuk (Ryabinska, 2011: 8; Pleines, 2016: 124). 
Seeing as television is the main source of information for Ukrainians, this oﬀers the owners of 
television stations a significant amount of influence (see Zerkalo Nedeli, 2011 and R&B Group, 
2017). Oligarchs started buying media outlets in the 1990s, for reasons of both influence and 
prestige (Ryabinska, 2011: 9). After the turn of the century the media started to be used 
increasingly for political purposes, which translated into the smearing of opponents or the 
favouring of the one or the other politician. This benefited the oligarchs either in the form of direct 
revenue from political advertising, or by promoting a politician who is favourable towards the 
oligarchs’ interests (Ryabinska, 2011: 6-7). This process is confirmed in the OSCE/ODIHR report 
following the 2010 presidential elections: It concludes that agreements between candidates and 
TV stations determined who received coverage in the news and noted that this contradicts 
fairness and impartiality (OSCE/ODIHR, 2010: 6). 	 

	 Finally, an oligarch can use his considerable private financial means to influence policy in a 
number of ways. In fact, this is a general thread running through all the above strategies but it 
deserves to be listed separately as using financial means is connected to, but not exclusive to the 
mechanisms listed above. It follows from the previous paragraphs that an oligarch can use his 
considerable wealth and take advantage of Ukraine’s relatively unregulated system to realise 
anything from buying seats in parliament, to financing political parties or bribing rivals (Kuzio, 
2016: 134; Aslund, 2014: 67). But apart from this, one can also think about using wealth for 
sponsoring non-governmental organisations, or as we will see later, to finance armed groupings. 

 

Individuals Businesses Political projects TV channels Origin
Dissident 
oligarchs
• Pavlo 
Lazarenko

• Yulia 
Tymoshenko
• Bloc Yulia 
Timoshenko 
(2001-2012)

• Batkivshchyna 
(1999 - )
Dnipropetrovsk
Liberal 
oligarchs
• Viktor 
Pinchuk

• Serhiy Tihipko

• Petro 
Poroshenko
• EastOne 
(former 
Interpipe) 

• Roshen
• Bloc Petro 
Poroshenko 
(2014 - )

• Strong Ukraine 
(1999 - 2012; 
2014 - )
• STB

• ICTV

• Novy
Dnipropetrovsk
Patriotic 
oligarchs
• Ihor 
Kolomoiskiy
• Privat group

• UkrNafta

• UkrTransNafta

• Ukraine 
International 
Airlines (UIA)
• Our Ukraine 
(2005 - )

• UDAR (2010 -)
• 1+1

• 2+2
Dnipropetrovsk
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(Aslund, 2015: 30; Kuzio, 2015; Kuzio, 2016; Ryabinska, 2011; Szeptycki, 2008)

2.2 Business interests 
For the purpose of understanding better each oligarch’s position on questions of European 
integration and to comprehend the context of the conflict in Ukraine in 2014, it is worth examining 
what their business interests are, who they conduct their trade with and where their assets are 
located. For reasons of practicality, it is impossible to address here every oligarch listed in the 
table above as well as a great number of medium-level oligarchs I have omitted. Therefore, I will 
limit myself to the most prominent ones (in terms of wealth and political influence), of which three 
also appear in more detail later in my case studies; Rinat Akhmetov, Viktor Pinchuk, Ihor 
Kolomoiskiy and Dmitro Firtash.

2.2.1 Rinat Akhmetov 
Akhmetov is the richest man in Ukraine at the time of writing and was so as well in 2014 (Forbes, 
2017). He is part of the Donetsk clan and is closely associated with Viktor Yanukovich and the 
Party of Regions. His background is rather opaque, as he keeps this a guarded secret but it is 
suspected he was connected to the Donetsk criminal underworld in the early 1990s (Kuzio, 2015: 
420). After inheriting capital from his former ‘mentor’, he went on to invest this in a great number 
of businesses under the title System Capital Management (SCM). They include enterprises in 
metallurgy and mining, power generation, banking and insurance, telecommunications, 
transportation, media and real estate (Kuzio, 2015: 421). Since the Yanukovich presidency 
Akhmetov especially focused on power engineering and metallurgy and eventually moved on to 
acquire a major telephone company (Matuszak, 2012: 53). He owns metallurgy plants and power 
plants in a number of places, including Central and Eastern Ukraine. Since 2011, he also 
possesses Ukraine’s largest coal mines, giving him a majority share in the production of energy 
coal (ibid.). Writing in 2008, Szeptycki states that at the time, SCM was dependent on good 
relations with both Europe and Russia for his enterprises (Szeptycki, 2008: 46). Politically, the 
Gas lobby • Dmytro 
Firtash

• Serhiy 
Lyovochkin

• Yuriy Boyko
• RosUkrEnergo 
(RUE)

• OstChem

• Group DF
• Opposition Bloc 
(2014 - )
• Inter Mostly Western 
Ukraine
Donetsk clan • Rinat 
Akhmetov

• Vitaliy Hayduk

• Serhiy Taruta
• System Capital 
Management 
(SCM)

• Ukrtelecom

• Metinvest 
Group

• DTEK

• HarvEast

• Industrial Union 
of Donbass 
(ISD)
• Party of 
Regions (1997 - 
2014)
• Ukraina Donetsk
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Party of Regions that Akhmetov is in standpoints closer to Russia, but Akhmetov recognises that 
the most significant opportunities for business lie in Europe. Not coincidentally, Akhmetov owns 
steel works in the UK and Italy, as well as Bulgaria, making further European integration desirable 
for him (ibid.). On the other hand, Akhmetov’s businesses are connected to Russia through loans 
he received from the Russian Sberbank (Zarembo, 2012: 12).

2.2.2 Viktor Pinchuk

Viktor Pinchuk is considered a ‘liberal oligarch’, even though he enjoyed a more disputed 
reputation himself during the Kuchma presidency (Szeptycki, 2008: 49). He is the son-in-law of 
former president Kuchma and this gave him a very favourable position for the winning of 
government tenders and striking profitable deals (Matuszak, 2012: 107). Pinchuk is mainly a 
symbol of the oligarchic system before 2004, after which the Orange Revolution shifted the 
balance of power in favour of other oligarchs. After the revolution, Pinchuk started developing his 
image as a liberal and philanthropist - supporting progressive forces in Ukraine, sponsoring arts 
and culture and promoting Ukraine abroad. He has prided himself on not seeking political power 
and believes business and politics should be separated (Kuzio, 2015: 390). Pinchuks activities 
focus on the steel sector (producing pipes under the title Interpipe), banking and media 
(Szeptycki, 2008: 49). He owned pipe rolling factories in both Ukraine and Russia (Matuszak, 
2012: 108). At the same time, Russia is an important export market for his pipes - 25% of its sales 
come from the Eurasian Customs Union and most of which from Russia (Forbes, 2014). In 
general, for his businesses access to foreign markets is key for Pinchuk and he has therefore 
always supported integration with the EU, but at the same time he maintained that Ukraine 
needed to cooperate with both Russia and Europe (Pinchuk, 2006). 

2.2.3 Ihor Kolomoisky

Ihor Kolomoisky is one of the oligarchs who came up in Dnipropetrovsk and is the founder of the 
Privat group, consisting of the Privat bank and a large number of connected companies. 
Compared to Akhmetov or Pinchuk, relatively little is known about it because Kolomoisky has 
generally tried to maintain a low profile. Up until the Euromaidan, he spend most of his time living 
in Switzerland (Kuzio, 2015: 392). Apart from the Privat bank, Kolomoisky also controlled 
businesses in the energy sector (including Ukrnafta), mining and metallurgy (Szeptycki, 2008: 59). 
Furthermore, Kolomoisky owns Ukraine International Airlines, the largest airline of Ukraine. 

Additionally Kolomoisky has business interests abroad in a great number of countries, ranging 
from Russia and Georgia to Italy, Ghana, the Czech Republic, the United States and the United 
Kingdom (Szeptycki, 2008: 60). At the same time his key interests were still in Ukraine, however. 
According to some, his return to Ukraine and his later accepting of political oﬃce can be seen in 
the light of his business interests in the east part of the country and around Dnipropetrovsk: His 
key assets were located here and by taking political oﬃce, he could possibly influence the 
situation (Kononczuk, 2015: 4). In a later chapter, more attention will be paid to these dynamics
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2.2.4 Dmitro Firtash

Dmitro Firtash is seen as the face of the important Ukrainian gas lobby and he made his fortunes 
starting in the 1990s, by functioning as a middleman between Russia and Ukraine in the gas 
trading business. He was one of the first and the most successful in importing natural gas from 
Russia at a low subsidised rate and then resell it on the European market. This scheme required 
cooperation from both the Ukrainian and Russian governments, but because of the huge rewards 
involved, neither side objected. In fact, there is substantial evidence that the incomes generated 
this way were transferred to both Ukrainian and Russian government elites (Matuszak, 2012: 18). 
This practice was temporarily interrupted while Yulia Timoshenko held the post of prime minister, 
but a report by Reuters shows that it continued under the leadership of Firtash all the way up until 
2014 (Reuters, 2014). Evidently, Firtash held good contacts in the Russian government as he 
managed to negotiate a new deal with Gazprom in 2011, in spite of the higher profits Gazprom 
could have made selling the gas in Western Europe (Reuters, 2014). His business interests then 
mostly revolved around maintaining his position and warm relations with the Yanukovich 
government on the one hand and the Putin government on the other, as this is what his income 
depended on. Apart from this Firtash owned a number of chemical plants in Ukraine producing 
nitrogen fertilisers as well as Crimea Titan, a titanium producing plant in Crimea, and Nadra, one 
of Ukraine’s largest banks (Matuszak, 2012: 51-52).
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3. Oligarchs and the EU Association process 
3.1 What is the Association Agreement? 
Before proceeding with my analysis of the specific role of oligarchs in the EU association process, 
it is useful to examine first what exactly this Association Agreement (AA) entails and how the 
negotiations around it developed. Its importance is obvious when one considers that the refusal 
by Viktor Yanukovich to sign the Agreement is considered to be the spark that ignited the Maidan 
revolution and set in motion the rest of the events that followed in 2013 - 2014 (Yekelchyk, 2015: 
163).

	 An Association Agreement is a bilateral agreement that the European Union can conclude 
with third countries, with the aim of setting up an ‘all-embracing framework to conduct bilateral 
relations’ (EEAS, 2011). It is an instrument to bring countries closer to EU standards and norms 
and can function as a preparation for future membership of the European Union but it is not 
necessarily followed by it. One of the main elements of the agreement is the liberalisation of trade 
in the form of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), but it can also include 
security policy and cover subjects such as juridicial reform and environmental standards 
(European Commission, 2014). The DCFTA was of major significance in the Ukrainian case, as it 
would promote the opening of markets through the removal of tariﬀs and quotas, as well as 
promote the harmonisation of laws. This would in turn facilitate a great increase in cross border 
trade between the European Union and Ukraine. 

	 Negotiations for the conclusion of an Association Agreement started in March 2007, when 
Viktor Yuschenko was president in Ukraine (Spiliopoulos, 2014: 257). The process got another 
boost when Ukraine became a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2008, after 
which it was decided to add the DCFTA component to the agreement. With the election of 
Yanukovich in 2010 (who was considered a pro-Russian politician), the alignment with European 
norms and values appeared to take a hit but the EU signalled that it was still hoping to finalise the 
AA by 2011 (European Comission, 2011). This was hindered, however, by the imprisonment of 
opposition politician Yulia Timoshenko which was condemned by the EU, and this subsequently 
stalled the process (Pastore, 2014: 8). It took two more years before the negotiations went ahead 
following Timoshenko’s imprisonment and this time it was Yanukovich who delayed the talks. The 
generally accepted reason for this was that the pressure on Yanukovich from Russia started 
mounting, as Putin was trying to keep Ukraine close to the Russian sphere of influence and to 
prevent the signing of the agreement. Russia did this by increasing tariﬀs and limiting imports 
from Ukraine, damaging the vulnerable Ukrainian economy (Pastore, 2014: 14). Still, the signing of 
the Agreement was planned to take place during the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 
November 2013. After a number of meetings with Russian president Putin, however, Yanukovich 
eventually decided to stop the association process altogether and it was this refusal to sign the 
agreement at the upcoming summit that was the direct cause of the subsequent protests that 
broke out in Kiev and came to be known as the Euromaidan (Aslund, 2013).
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3.2 Attitudes towards EU integration 
Now I will examine the oligarchs’ attitudes towards European integration, for the purpose of 
finding out whether it was an issue they wanted to exercise influence over at all. When looking at 
the attitudes and actions of oligarchs in Ukraine, first it needs to be recognised that it is rather 
problematic talking about them as a homogenic group, a fact noted by the OSW Centre for 
Eastern Studies (Matuszak, 2012: 66). Previously, I have illustrated how the most prominent 
oligarchs conduct their business in diﬀerent places and are part of several political alliances. It is 
not surprising, therefore, that they have diﬀerent opinions concerning association with the 
European Union. Regardless, it is possible to highlight certain trends when it comes to oligarchs 
and their attitude towards the EU. According to a 2012 policy paper by the Ukrainian Institute of 
World Policy, at the end of 2011 there existed a ‘passive consensus’ in favour of the AA/DCFTA 
amongst the oligarchs (Zarembo, 2012: 8). The oligarchs were generally positive about it as a solid 
regulatory system could benefit them by guaranteeing ownership rights and eﬀective competition, 
notwithstanding the fact that most of them made their initial fortunes thanks to opaque laws and 
informal agreements. 

	 The corresponding mechanism is described by Pleines: After oligarchs accumulate their 
wealth, they become interested in a functioning legal system that secures property rights so that 
they can then consolidate their riches - as would be the case when adopting EU norms and 
regulations (Pleines, 2016: 109). Instead, if Ukraine would decide upon a pro-Russian course and 
enter the Customs Union, ‘their [the oligarchs’] ownership rights will constantly be under 
threat’ (Kropatcheva, 2014: 15). This view corresponds with what one of my respondents said and 
is shared by Olga Shumylo-Tapiola; on the basis of her research she also concludes that the 
majority of the oligarchs were in favour of the DCFTA for this reason (Interviewee 2, 2017; 
Shumylo-Tapiola, 2012: 13). The OSW disagrees with the IWP and the latter in terms of their 
qualification of oligarchic support for integration, however: It objects by saying that the oligarchs 
were best served by the status quo and the position of Ukraine as a crossroads between Russia 
and the EU. This position is also exemplified by a statement made by Dmitro Firtash in 2014, 
saying ‘Ukraine needs to become a bridge between the West and Russia’ (Firtash, 2014). 
According to the OSW, this status quo would be preferred by some oligarchs for them to continue 
to benefit from the informal connections between business and politics and to be able to buy oﬀ 
courts and influence the law making process (Matuszak, 2012: 66).

	 I believe the main distinction between the assessment made by Pleines, Shumylo-Tapiola 
and others and the analysis by the OSW comes down to the individual oligarch one focuses on. It 
appears conceivable that lower-level oligarchs who still have some to gain from the legal grey 
area in the status quo situation do not favour EU association yet whereas those who have already 
made their fortunes favour European integration to protect their acquired wealth. Furthermore, 
there is a basis to believe that the argument made by the OSW only functions accordingly for 
Ukraine at the domestic level, because some of the richest oligarchs are actually heavily invested 
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abroad and therefore have a key interest in the opening of foreign markets in the West. For 
example, the very important metallurgy sector would be a sector that could benefit greatly from 
access to the West European markets (Proedrou, 2010: 450). Considering the above and seeing 
as I focus on the most prominent Ukrainian oligarchs, it seems reasonable to assume that they 
indeed tilted towards integration with the EU at least hypothetically.

3.3 Oligarchs in Brussels and Davos 
Regardless of their attitudes, what oligarchs think and what they do remain diﬀerent things. For 
this reason, I will now explore whether oligarchs made a conscious eﬀort to play a role in the EU 
integration process - for better or for worse - and whether their impact was facilitated by 
Ukraine’s domestic structures. The first case concerns eﬀorts by oligarchs to advance the 
integration process. A notable role was played in this regard by Rinat Akhmetov and Viktor 
Pinchuk.

	 Akhmetov belongs to the Donetsk clan and had economic ties with Russia, leading one to 
think he might have resisted the DCFTA to avoid antagonising his Russian partners. Evidence 
shows, however, that Akhmetov realised the potential of economic cooperation with Europe and 
began to promote integration with the European Union (Havrylyshyn, 2016: 154). These economic 
gains from EU association as opposed to joining the Russia-centered Customs Union are 
illustrated in the 2012 IWP report, showing how the EU would oﬀer a $14 trillion market with 500 
million relatively aﬄuent consumers, compared to a $2 trillion market and 170 million poorer 
consumers in the Customs Union (Zarembo, 2012: 9). These business opportunities translated to 
Akhmetov backing integration with the EU and the drafting of the DCFTA. In concrete terms, first 
he used his financial means to organise events that put European integration on the agenda in 
Ukraine and in Brussels. In Ukraine for example, he established and financed a fund for the 
development of Ukraine named the ‘Fund for Eﬀective Governance’. Through this fund, he 
allocated significant resources to make Ukrainian business compliant with EU standards and 
worked on corresponding modernisation projects (Shibalov, 2013). At the same time, it would host 
events to raise awareness about the subject. For example, on April 24th 2012 this fund organised 
a debate under the title ‘Ukraine has more to gain from free trade with the EU than with the 
Customs Union, is that so?’ (Skachko, 2012 - translation by author).

	 At the European level, Akhmetov was active as well: He financially supported the Mission 
of Ukraine to the EU by organising events aimed at improving the integration process (Zarembo, 
2012: 9). Subsequently, when the Vilnius summit approached he became an increasingly vocal 
supporter for signing the Agreement and he also started taking a more decisive position in public 
from that moment on. Leading up to the summit, in a reaction to RFERL he stated that he 
believed that ‘increasing Russian assertiveness led big business to look west’ - implicating that he 
supported European integration (Coalson, 2013). Similarly, at a business forum in Donetsk he 
hinted to Yanukovich that Ukraine should adopt Western rules of doing business [instead of those 
existing in Ukraine at the time] (Shibalov, 2013). Finally, when it became apparent that Yanukovich 
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would not sign the agreement after all, Akhmetov became more outspoken. A number of days 
after the decision not to sign, Akhmetov’s System Capital Management issued a statement that 
declared that ‘SCM Group is built on the fundamental European values’ (Aslund, 2013). From this 
moment on, Akhmetov has publicly supported European integration, which is also reflected by his 
slashing of the financing of the Fund for Eﬀective Governance as a reaction on the failure to sign 
the Agreement (Korrespondent, 2013b). Through this measure, he likely attempted to pressure the 
Yanukovich administration to reconsider its decision. On the whole then, this shows that 
Akhmetov has made increasing eﬀorts to promote integration with the EU. Before appearing in 
public, he has funded projects aimed at speeding up the process and after the failure to sign the 
agreement, he has taken a more public - albeit still hesitant - role in promoting the signing of the 
agreement.

	 Another strategy was taken by Viktor Pinchuk. In contrast to Akhmetov, he has for a long 
time publicly supported initiatives to integrate Ukraine into the EU (Thomas, 2008). The most 
important channel in this regard is the Yalta European Strategy (YES). This is an annual 
conference where high-level government oﬃcials convene to ‘discuss Ukraine’s European future 
and global context’ (Yalta European Strategy, 2017). It is a project founded by Pinchuk that he 
started in 2004, when he first invited several dozen European leaders to Ukraine. There can be no 
doubt about the purpose of the conferences: In one of its documents the YES called for Ukraine’s 
membership of the EU by 2020 (Fischer et al, 2008: 73). In order to advance this process, Pinchuk 
personally spent significant sums of money to invite big names in politics, business and media to 
participate in the conference. Noteworthy is that at the 2013 edition, even Yanukovich was 
present and reaﬃrmed Ukraine’s pro-European course (Leshchenko, 2013). At the same time, 
Pinchuk went abroad to promote Ukraine there as well. The Davos World Economic forum served 
as an important platform and became a place for promoting Ukrainian European integration 
(Zarembo, 2012: 9). Here, Pinchuk organised a lunch event for prestigious guests in 2007 under 
the title ‘Where is Ukraine heading?’ to focus attention on Ukraine (Fischer et al, 2008: 73). In the 
course of a decade developments within the European Union did make Pinchuk more sceptical 
about the challenges of rapid EU integration, as is illustrated by an interview with him in 2010 
(Korrespondent, 2010: 20). But in any case, Pinchuk stated that he still believed the European 
choice was the only right one (ibid.). Finally, in terms of the Association Agreement and the 
subsequent failure to sign it by Yanukovich, Pinchuk kept a relatively low profile but he did praise 
the protestors for taking to the street (Weaver, 2013). 

	 Akhmetov and Pinchuk are highlighted here because they are the two most prominent 
oligarchs to have promoted European integration. They are not the only oligarchs to do this, 
however: The IWP claims that almost every oligarch has financed activities promoting Ukraine’s 
European integration in some way, including future president Petro Poroshenko (Zarembo, 2012: 
9). There is just one notable exception to this, in the person of Viktor Medvedchuk. He is one of 
the few oligarchs who has sponsored a campaign to sway public opinion against the agreement. 
Medvedchuk is a controversial oligarch who has been politically active since the late 1990s and 
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served as chief of staﬀ in the Leonid Kuchma administration. His role in Ukrainian politics is 
especially notable because of his personal ties with Vladimir Putin, who he considers a close 
friend and who is the godfather of his daughter (Kovensky, 2016). Medvedchuk acquired his 
wealth in the early 1990s and was the leader of the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine, being 
voted into parliament for the first time in 1997 (D’Anieri, 2007: 101). He has always been strongly 
connected to former president Leonid Kuchma, for whom he worked as chief of staﬀ from 2002 
until 2005. Medvedchuk is known for his pro-Russian, anti-European standpoints that he voices 
through the organisation Ukrainian Choice, that he founded in 2011. According to its website, its 
goal is the “realisation of the people’s constitutional right to govern the nation, to take part in the 
making of decisions that are strategically important for the state” (Ukrainskiy Vybor, 2017 - 
translation by author). In practice, it has stood for recognising Russian as the second oﬃcial 
language in Ukraine and a halting of the European integration process (Azar, 2014). In the run up 
to the eventual signing of the Association Agreement, Ukrainian Choice became known for 
running an active campaign aimed at swaying public opinion against the agreement. This is 
illustrated by an ad campaign financed by the organisation that was aimed at discrediting the EU 
by claiming that ‘Association with the EU means same-sex marriages’, which is a sensitive topic 
amongst Ukrainians (Miller, 2014). Furthermore, its representatives claimed that millions would 
lose their job over the agreement (Grytsenko & Walker, 2013). In short, Medvedchuk’s organisation 
is in fact rather comparable to Akhmetov’s Fund for Eﬀective Governance, even though its goals 
were diametrically opposed and its strategies more unorthodox.

	 Having now examined the role of several oligarchs in trying to advance or slow down 
Ukrainian European integration, it is worth returning to the main question: To what extent has the 
role of oligarchs in Ukraine’s political system shaped its foreign policy? I believe that in this case, 
one could argue that the activities described above are in fact not characteristic for the Ukrainian 
political system. The process whereby Akhmetov, Pinchuk and Medvedchuk have tried to 
influence Ukraine’s foreign policy course in the context of the Association Agreement can still be 
considered within the legitimate lobbying process and this does not indicate any practices 
particularly associated with a neopatrimonial system. This reasoning was also followed by a 
Ukrainian government oﬃcial when asked about this (Interviewee 1, 2017). The only thing one 
could point out here is the use of significant financial resources to influence public opinion 
through advertising and promotion campaigns. But in this context, one could question to what 
extent this is specific for Ukraine when compared to corporate lobbying in any consolidated 
democracy. 

3.4 Lobbying the Association Agreement 
Another image emerges when it comes to the negotiations around the Association Agreement 
itself. During the seven year process of negotiating the DCFTA, the terms for Ukrainian-European 
trade cooperation were to be determined. For this purpose, the European Commission negotiation 
team met with their Ukrainian counterparts roughly once in two months during the period of four 
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years. The concept document was finished in July 2012, but the eventual signing was delayed 
due to political circumstances. Already in the initial phases was there doubt among some analysts 
that businessmen with major interests in Russia or those who would be opposed to the free trade 
agreement with the EU for other reasons would attempt to influence the negotiations to their 
advantage. Especially the agricultural sector, the automotive industry and the textile industry were 
topics of discussion (Matuszak, 2011).

	 Based on her research, Shumylo-Tapiola concludes that business groups have indeed 
tried to influence the DCFTA negotiation process to their advantage (Shumylo-Tapiola, 2012: 13). 
As expected, the automobile industry turned out to pose an obstacle during the negotiations, 
which is in turn illustrated in the 2012 OSW study. It describes how there was a long lasting lack 
of consent by the Ukrainian side about lifting the customs duty on the import of used cars and 
household appliances that was most likely attributable to the less prominent oligarchs Tariel 
Vasadze and Valentyn Landyk (Matuszak, 2012: 71). This is confirmed by my interview with an EU 
oﬃcial directly involved in the negotiations process, where the tariﬀs and quotas concerning the 
automotive industry was named the ‘trickiest’ topic during the negotiations as well (Interviewee 2, 
2017). These problems stemmed from complaints by Vasadze, himself owner of the major car 
manufacturer UkrAVTO and at the same time member of parliament for the Party of Regions. He 
lamented that after the abolition of the customs duty he would not be able to compete anymore 
on the international market (Savitskiy, 2013). He argued that a reduction of import tariﬀs for 
passenger cars would flood Ukraine with cheap European import and that this would hurt his 
business. For this reason, he repeatedly opposed the agreement and publicly argued for stalling it 
(Finance UA, 2011; Sidorenko, 2010). At the same time, he used his personal ties to the Party of 
Regions to try to lobby the government into not signing the DCFTA (Langbein, 2016: 14). In this 
sense, he used both his formal position as a parliamentarian as well as his informal connections 
to gain access to policy making and to try to influence the negotiations. Subsequently, in the final 
agreement the European Union had made concessions and agreed to less stringent tariﬀs and a 
generous 15-year transition period (Interviewee 2, 2017). This final compromise is generally 
considered to be favourable to Vasadze’s private interests and therefore leads one to suspect that 
his lobbying eﬀorts were to some extent successful (Matuszak, 2012: 71). In the case of Landyk 
on the other hand, there are no hints in the final agreement of his involvement - it is not 
particularly favourable to his household appliances business. Still, like Vasadze he was also 
representing his business interests while simultaneously being a member of parliament for the 
Party of Regions. Furthermore, his lobbying eﬀorts were of a more public nature than in the case 
of Vasadze: It was publicly announced that Landyk had had a meeting with president Yanukovich 
in 2013, asking him to at least delay the integration process by a year (DS News). This is a clear 
indication of his informal access to policy making structures, in addition to his formal position in 
parliament. 

	 Additionally, it has emerged that one more oligarch has been active in trying to impact the 
negotiations in an other area of European integration. In this case, the ongoing European 
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Common Aviation Area (ECAA) talks are suspected to have been inhibited by Ihor Kolomoiskiy, 
who owns the majority share in Ukraine’s aviation business (Matuszak, 2012: 71-72). The ECAA 
would facilitate the liberalisation of air transport and allow foreign flight operators into Ukraine, but 
so far negotiations on this topic have not been successful for opaque reasons. Flight operators 
other than those belonging to Kolomoiskiy’s Privat Group have blamed Kolomoiskiy for the failing 
negotiations and have accused him of striking deals with politicians to maintain his monopoly in 
the sector in return for political favours (Delo Ukraina, 2016). More recent developments confirm 
this theory: On July 10, 2017 Ryanair announced that it would halt its attempt to enter the 
Ukrainian market in face of resistance from Ukraine International Airlines, a company owned by 
Kolomoiskiy. Kolomoiskiy’s personal role in opposing the liberalisation of the Ukrainian airspace is 
in turn exemplified by a recent lawsuit he filed against the Ukrainian Infrastructure Ministry and 
Ryanair, demanding financial compensation and a revocation of Ryanair’s permit to operate in Lviv 
(Melkozerova, 2017). This way, he attempted to pressure the Ukrainian government and Ryanair 
into passivity so his monopoly would be maintained and liberalisation of the air space would be 
halted.

	 In the above cases, the exact degree to which oligarchs have managed to influence the 
outcome of negotiations remains unclear. Because of the nature of behind-the-scenes politicking, 
it is beyond the scope of this project to give an unambiguous qualification of their influence. Even 
though substantial evidence points in a certain direction, it is not possible to make any conclusive 
claims on this basis. At the same time there is also a reasonable chance that there are other 
industries where the process of European integration has had consequences for oligarchic 
businesses and where they might have tried to impact the process, but this will require more 
research. What I believe these cases do illustrate well is how the domestic structure in Ukraine 
facilitates access to foreign policy for business elites in a way particular for this political system. 
Whereas the organising of events promoting Ukrainian European integration by Pinchuk and 
Akhmetov can arguably be considered to be within the framework of legitimate lobbying as would 
also take place in a consolidated democracy, attempts by oligarchs to impact the Association 
Agreement to their benefit more clearly reflect how oligarchs have access to policy in Ukraine. The 
cases of both Vasadze and Landyk show how important business elites at the same time preside 
over their businesses and fulfil a political position. This political position gives them important 
formal and informal access points to policy making, including in cases of foreign policy such as 
the negotiating process over international agreements. In turn, they are able to use these access 
points to promote their private interests. In the case of the ECAA, the course of events also 
suggests that Kolomoisky used his informal political influence to prevent the liberalisation of the 
Ukrainian air space and thereby impacted Ukrainian foreign policy making. 
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4. Oligarchs and the conflicts in Crimea and in Eastern 
Ukraine 
4.1 What happened in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine? 
The second case I will examine in the context of Ukrainian foreign policy in 2010-2014 is the 
annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. These were 
defining foreign policy events, that had important consequences for all Ukrainians. The question 
here is what this has meant for the Ukrainian oligarchs: To what extent have they had an impact 
on the development of these two conflicts and was this facilitated by Ukraine’s domestic 
structure? First, I will give a concise history of what happened in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.

	 The annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Eastern Ukraine are generally regarded to be 
connected to Yanukovich’s refusal to sign the Association Agreement and the protests that 
erupted as a result of it. The ouster of Yanukovich and Ukraine’s apparent pro-European turn 
raised worries in Moscow and prompted it to take action in Ukraine in what they considered a 
‘counter-coup’ against the pro-European protesters (Sakwa, 2015: 280). This started in Crimea, a 
region that had been a disputed topic since the collapse of the Soviet Union, as it had become 
part of Ukraine but was predominantly Russian-speaking and continued to have the Russian 
Black Sea Fleet stationed at the regional capital of Sevastopol. The take-over of the peninsula 
started on February 27, 2014 when armed men started occupying government buildings (Yuhas & 
Jalabi, 2014). These men, who appeared in uniforms without markings, came to be known as 
‘little green men’ or ‘polite men’ but turned out to be Russian soldiers (Shevchenko, 2014). There 
was little resistance coming from the Ukrainian side, who held their positions for some time before 
withdrawing altogether. This lack of resistance can be attributed to a number of factors, from ill 
preparation, to the vacuum that existed in the government to Ukrainian oﬃcers who were 
themselves sympathetic to Russia (Polityuk & Zverev, 2014). After securing control over the 
peninsula, the local government organised a referendum about reunification with Russia, aimed at 
legitimising the annexation. This controversial referendum took place on March 16 and with a 
83.1% turnout, 96.77% of the population voted in favour of joining (Sakwa, 2015: 291). The 
referendum was declared illegal by the UN General Assembly and only Russia and a number of its 
allies voted against this declaration (Yekelchyk, 2015: 5). The reality was, however, that Crimea 
had de facto become part of Russia and Ukraine was not able to change the situation in the short 
term. 

	 Following the annexation of Crimea, popular uprisings started in parts of Eastern Ukraine 
as well, with the same purpose of seceding from Ukraine. In early April, protesters occupied 
government buildings in several cities in Eastern Ukraine, including Donetsk, Luhansk and 
Kharkiv. The protesters started ill-equipped but evolved into groups of professional, well-armed 
men (Sakwa, 2015: 404). On April 7, the protesters in the most significant city in the region, 
Donetsk, proclaimed the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and the Lugansk People’s Republic 
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(LPR) would follow some weeks later. Contrary to the Crimea case, this secession did provoke a 
direct military response from the Ukrainian government. On April 15, Kiev announced that it was 
starting its ‘Counter-Terrorism Operation’ against the separatists in Eastern Ukraine (Sakwa, 2015: 
406). This operation developed into a full-scale war, culminating in major battles in the Summer of 
2014. The operation was initially successful, but owing to Russian assistance to the separatist 
forces, the Ukrainian army was not able to reassert complete control over the region (Kuzio, 2015: 
111-112). Eventually, on September 5, 2014 a truce was signed that would form the basis of the 
precarious cease-fire agreement that is still in place at the time of writing (BBC, 2014). 

4.2 Crimea 
Now I will explore the role of oligarchs in the conflict that started with the annexation of Crimea. A 
number of oligarchs like Ihor Kolomoiskiy and Dmitro Firtash had clear business interests in 
Crimea when the annexation of the peninsula started and Akhmetov also owned assets or 
businesses in the area. The oligarchs’ presence in Crimea is further illustrated in a 2013 report by 
the Ukrainian Centre for Investigative Journalism, that identified the owners of Crimea’s most 
expensive beach properties. A number of familiar oligarchs appear in this list, including 
Kolomoiskiy, Akhmetov, one of Akhmetov’s business partners Vadim Novinskiy and Viktor 
Medvedchuk (Tsentr Zhurnalistkych Rassledovaniy, 2013). From a strictly material perspective 
then, one might expect them to have resisted the annexation of the Crimea as it could threaten 
their properties if ownership rights would not be honoured under Russian rule.

	 But as a matter of fact, there is little evidence that any of the oligarchs took decisive action 
in order to influence policy around the events unfolding on the Crimea in early 2014. Reactions 
were mostly mild and conciliatory and did not harshly condemn Russia for its actions. In response 
to the events in Crimea, Akhmetov posted an appeal to Ukrainians on his Facebook page: In it, he 
calls upon citizens, politicians and businessmen to keep a cool head and unite to maintain the 
integrity of the country (112 News, 2014). He does not mention Russia by name nor does he 
suggest any subsequent course of action. His business partner, Vadim Novinskiy, made similar 
statements. A former Russian national, Novinsky received Ukrainian citizenship in 2012 by 
Yanukovich and went on to participate in elections in the Sevastopol region in Crimea on an 
agenda promoting Russian as the second language and opting for membership of the Customs 
Union (Korrespondent, 2013a). With the events in Crimea developing, however, he proclaimed to 
support the integrity of Crimea and stated that he considered Crimea an integral part of Ukraine 
(Liga Novosti, 2014). His generally pro-Russian agenda therefore perhaps makes his 
proclamations somewhat more significant, as he was deviating from what one might expect to 
hear from him by speaking out in this way. Nevertheless, apart from these statements there are 
few reasons to suspect they actively tried to influence the proceedings.

	 The only instance where oligarchs have acted in the Crimea case was in preventing their 
own assets from being expropriated. After the annexation of Crimea, Russia started a 
nationalisation program on the peninsula where former owners of land or businesses were 
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dispossessed to the benefit of the Crimean government (MacFarquhar, 2015). Among these 
assets were those belonging to the Privat Bank (owned by Kolomoiskiy), a holiday complex 
owned by Serhiy Taruta and the Crimean branch of Ukrtelekom, owned by Rinat Akhmetov 
(Molchanov, 2015). Consequently, these aﬀected oligarchs have started various law suits to 
reclaim their properties. But these actions are not indicative of any impact on Ukrainian foreign 
policy as they only concern the protection of their private interests. One can speculate about the 
reason for the oligarchs’ relative inactivity in the Crimea case, but it corresponds with the general 
passivity in Ukraine among politicians and civilians in the Crimean crisis - which might be 
attributable to the speed at which events were taking place or the political vacuum at the time. On 
the other hand, it might have been a rational calculation to not antagonise Russia, where some 
also still had business interests. One can only say for certain that the situation looks diﬀerent 
when one looks at the conflict in the rest of Eastern Ukraine. A number of oligarchs had a stake in 
this conflict and contrary to the Crimea case, they have been more active players on the political 
stage. The main players can be identified as the major oligarchs like Akhmetov and Kolomoiskiy, 
as well as some important but lesser known individuals like Serhiy Taruta and Viktor Medvedchuk. 
Their role in this regard will be discussed below. 

4.3 Eastern Ukraine: Institutionalisation 
The first direct consequence of the start of the unrest in Eastern Ukraine was the promotion of 
some oligarchs to important political posts, institutionalising their role in Ukrainian policy making.

Their promotion to politics was part of an attempt by the Ukrainian interim government to 
maintain some stability and continuity at a point when instability and violent separatism was 
growing in Eastern Ukraine (Kramer, 2014). Seeing how oligarchs control significant assets in the 
region and have political influence with the population, oﬀering them formal political positions was 
regarded as a pragmatic solution to foster stability. Their appointment was made uncomplicated 
by the laws in Ukraine, that allow governors to be appointed by the president rather than be 
elected. The first and most important two oligarchs to be oﬀered the post of governor and to 
accept this proposition were Ihor Kolomoiskiy and Serhiy Taruta.

	 In early 2014, Kolomoiskiy was still living in Switzerland but he returned to Ukraine when 
the conflict in the country started escalating. He was subsequently invited to become governor of 
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, the region in East Ukraine where he grew up and where he still enjoyed 
great influence (Rudenko, 2014). Upon having accepted the position, he took a radical anti-
separatist and anti-Russian position, insulting Vladimir Putin as well as Yanukovich for their 
participation in destabilising Ukraine (see Vovremya Novosti, 2014). He considered it his duty to 
fight separatism and to ensure that separatist forces would not advance further into Ukraine, the 
position that would earn him the label ‘patriot’. In order to influence the course of events with 
regard to the war in Eastern Ukraine, Kolomoiskiy used both his position as governor as well as 
well as his private financial means. At a political level, he took measures to defend the 
Dnipropetrovsk region against separatism: He created a number of volunteer battalions to 
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complement the Ukrainian army, that would both patrol the city of Dnipropetrovsk and help fight 
on the frontline in the Donbass (Butchenko, 2014). Furthermore, he established a region-wide 
fund through which middle-class businessmen could contribute financially to the war eﬀort and he 
took action to strengthen Dnipropetrovsk’s general economic situation. Additionally, in a symbolic 
move to illustrate his determination, he started oﬀering a $10,000 bounty that he paid for 
personally for any pro-Russian militant with a firearm that was captured by Ukrainian forces 
(Cullison, 2014). 

Because of these measures, Kolomoiskiy is generally considered to have been very successful in 
halting the separatist advance further into Ukraine and can be seen as having played a role in 
Ukraine’s fight against separatism (Miecik, 2014).

	 Along with Kolomoiskiy, Donetsk clan oligarch Serhiy Taruta was at the same time likewise 
invited to fulfil a gubernatorial post in the problematic region of Donetsk. Serhiy Taruta is the most 
important business partner of Rinat Akhmetov and is one of the most influential oligarchs in the 
region. Similar to Kolomoiskiy, he was invited by interim president Oleksandr Turchynov to 
assume a political position because of his position as an influential businessman and his historical 
ties to the region (Danilova, 2014). His immediate task was to enter in negotiations with separatist 
forces, who had at the time just started occupying the municipal buildings in Donetsk. Even 
though Taruta himself was replaced rather quickly over personal disagreements with later 
president Poroshenko, during his time as governor he was personally responsible for negotiating 
with the representatives of the DPR over solving the conflict (Gordon UA, 2014). In this regard, he 
can be considered to have had some influence on the development on the conflict. Along with 
Kolomoiskiy then, Taruta’s governorship shows how through being appointed governors, oligarchs 
have gained important access points to policy concerning the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. 
Moreover, they earned their nominations because of their position as established and well-
connected oligarchs, showing how oligarchs in the Ukrainian system can easily assume formal 
oﬃce because of their position and can then continue to impact foreign policy. 

	 Apart from the promotion to governor of some oligarchs, the conflict in Eastern Ukraine 
also facilitated the promotion to another important political position of Viktor Medvedchuk. As I 
have mentioned in an earlier chapter, he is an oligarch who is often mentioned in context of his 
ties with the Russian president Vladimir Putin and who is known for his pro-Russian standpoints. 
It was also Putin who saw a role for him in the negotiations for reaching a settlement for the 
conflict in Eastern Ukraine and is said to have proposed his involvement to the other negotiating 
parties of the OSCE Contact Group, that was tasked with reaching a cease-fire agreement 
(Herszenhorn, 2015a). Shortly afterwards, on June 25, 2014 the controversial proposal to invite 
Medvedchuk to the negotiating table and act as a fixer during the negotiations of the OSCE 
Contact Group was eventually made by Angela Merkel (Censor, 2014). This proposal was 
subsequently accepted by the members of the contact group, including Ukrainian president 
Poroshenko. Medvedchuk himself said the reason for his appointment was that the separatist 
leaders would not talk to the Kiev authorities directly so they needed him to act as a mediator 
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(Buckley & Olearchyk, 2017). It is indeed Medvedchuk’s unique position between the diﬀerent 
factions, owing to his informal ties to the Russian leadership and the pro-Russian separatists, that 
help explain the Ukrainian approval of the decision which would otherwise perhaps be hard to 
comprehend. In terms of his assignments, Medvedchuk’s initial task was to arrange the exchange 
of prisoners between the warring sides (Herszenhorn, 2015a). But according to the Financial 
Times, sources state that his role is not limited to the topic of prisoner exchanges and that he is in 
fact involved in constant negotiations with the warring parties over the topic of the future status of 
the Donbass and the rest of Ukraine (Buckley & Olearchyk, 2017).

	 The scope of this project makes it impossible to ascertain what happened behind the 
closed doors of the Minsk Group or the Kremlin and based on this information the true extent of 
his impact on the settlement of the conflict remains unknown. But as in the case of the promotion 
to governor of Kolomoiskiy and Taruta, one can conclude that Medvedchuk was assigned an 
important political position with access points to the formulation of a settlement for the conflict 
thanks to the prominence of oligarchs in Ukraine’s political system. His informal ties to key players 
in the process facilitated his nomination, which would otherwise in the light of the hostility 
between Ukraine and Russia be hard to justify. Subsequently, the above mentioned oligarchs had 
a personal impact on the development of the conflict through negotiating with the separatists, 
financing military operations in the function of governor and by functioning as a mediator in the 
OSCE Contact Group. 

4.4 Eastern Ukraine: Private militias 
Another way in which oligarchs helped shape the outcome of the conflict was not through their 
informal networks or by assuming formal oﬃce, but through their material means. Akhmetov and 
Kolomoiskiy played a significant role in the conflict in this regard, as I will demonstrate below. At 
the moment when the war in Eastern Ukraine broke out, Akhmetov still owned significant 
businesses in the Donetsk region and he therefore had a major interest in protecting his assets 
from the unrest that was ensuing (Wilson, 2016: 7). For this reason, he started appearing in public 
in spite of his preference for staying out of the public eye. In his first public appearance since the 
protests in the Donbass broke out, Akhmetov travelled to the region and called upon the 
protesters to calm down and start talks with the authorities in Kiev in order to find a peaceful 
solution for the conflict (Sindelar, 2014b). Additionally, he appeared alongside Ukraine’s pro-
Western Prime Minister nearly a week later (ibid.). His language suggested an increasing support 
for the government in Kiev when he subsequently referred to the separatists as ‘bandits and 
looters’ and condemned them for making the people of Donetsk live in fear (Sindelar, 2014a; 
Matveeva & Kartsev, 2014). All these actions suggest that Akhmetov condemned the separatist 
movement in Eastern Ukraine, but so far he refrained from taking action against it.

	 On the other hand, empirically there are reasons to believe that Akhmetov in fact used his 
means to financially support separatist forces in the beginning phases of the war. Taras Kuzio 
reports about these ties, writing that the separatist Vostok and Oplot battalions were reportedly 
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close to Akhmetov (Kuzio, 2015: 424). This is confirmed by other sources as well: According to 
one of the leaders of the Donetsk People’s Republic, in the early phases of the separatist 
movement against Kiev almost all of the separatists received financial support from Akhmetov 
(Azarenko, 2014). A name that is often mentioned in this regard is Alexander Khodakovsky, who 
was the commander of the Vostok battalion at the time. He used to be a member of the Ukrainian 
security service in Donetsk, before he joined the separatist movement. During his life in Donetsk 
he was allied with Akhmetov and recent revelations have shown how he likely received payments 
from him while heading the Vostok battalion: For example, in an interview for a Russian 
broadcaster Aleksandr Borodaj, head of the Union for Volunteers of the Donbass, states that he 
witnessed Akhmetov handing Khodakovsky a suitcase of money to equip his battalion in 2014 
(Kotenok, 2017). These allegations are made more credible by other details that have emerged 
recently. First, hackers have managed to retrieve files reporting about meetings in late 2014 
between Akhmetov and the leadership of the DPR showing how he was involved in the promotion 
of Khodakovsky to leader of the DPR Security Council and other members of Akhmetov’s circle to 
other posts in the DPR (Novoye Vremya, 2015). Second, it emerged that members of the Vostok 
battalion were responsible for guarding Akhmetov’s property in the region, leading one to believe 
that they were financed by him (Romanenko, 2014). 

	 Altogether, looking at the evidence there is reason to expect that Akhmetov was 
connected to the separatist forces at least in the beginning of the conflict. Moreover, by shaping 
the military balance in the region, this means that he has had an impact on the development of 
the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Akhmetov managed to accomplish this by using his position as an 
authoritative figure in the region, his informal personal connections to some of the separatist 
leaders, as well as by using his personal financial means. In this sense, Akhmetov’s role in the 
conflict remains something of a unique case as he directly shaped Ukrainian foreign policy rather 
than influenced the foreign policy making process. A similar situation developed in the case of 
Kolomoiskiy. 

	 Apart from fulfilling his position as governor of Dnipropetrovsk, he also had a direct impact 
on the conflict itself, in a way comparable to Akhmetov. Other than the bounties he was financing 
from his personal means but in the name of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, he personally funded pro-
Ukrainian militias fighting in the East (Wilson, 2016: 7). As the Ukrainian forces were at the time 
underfunded and under equipped, Kolomoiskiy personally purchased equipment ranging from 
tires, car batteries, fuel and weaponry (Cullison, 2014). Reportedly, at some point he spent $10 
million per month in supporting the Ukrainian military and the volunteer militias (Kuzio, 2015: 392). 
The battalion most often noted for its connection to Kolomoiskiy is Dnipro-1, named after the city 
Dnipropetrovsk, but as of 2015, there are a number of others financed by him as well 
(Sergatskova, 2015). In this case, Kolomoiskiy’s impact on Ukrainian foreign policy is all too 
visible, as the Ukrainian state was directly dependent on Kolomoiskiy for the waging of its military 
operations. In fact, the reason he was later relieved of his position by Poroshenko was for the 
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reason that he was considered to have become too powerful because of his control over the 
armed militias (Herszenhorn, 2015b). 

	 The militias financed by Akhmetov and Kolomoiskiy present an interesting case for 
examining the relation between oligarchs and foreign policy in Ukraine. In the preceding sections 
of this piece, the emphasis was predominantly on the usage by oligarchs of informal networks 
and formal political power to influence foreign policy. In this sense, this fits well into the 
framework of policy making in neopatrimonial democracies. The examples above represent 
something of a unique case, however: In this instance, oligarchs have used their substantial 
material means to directly influence foreign policy by privately funding militias - rather than 
influence the policy making process. This fits less readily within the neopatrimonial or domestic 
decision making frameworks, but it is exemplary of the role of oligarchs in the Ukrainian political 
system: It shows how oligarchs can use their exceptional wealth and historically shaped regional 
ties to influence the outcome of foreign policy even outside of formal or informal political 
structures, by determining the course of a violent conflict.
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5. Conclusion and discussion 
In the previous chapters I have examined the relation between oligarchs and foreign policy in 
Ukraine. Central was the question to what extent the position of oligarchs in Ukraine’s political 
system has helped shape foreign policy in the cases of the negotiating of the Association 
Agreement with the European Union and the conflict in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.

	 In terms of the negotiations around the Association Agreement, I have found that the most 
prominent Ukrainian oligarchs were generally favourable towards it and have supported the 
process. This attitude led to a number of oligarchs promoting Ukrainian European integration at 
both the Ukrainian and European level, as did Akhmetov and Pinchuk. They founded pro-
European organisations and used their private means to organise events that promoted Ukraine’s 
European course. On the other hand, one of the few oligarchs that were opposed to the signing of 
the agreement, Viktor Medvedchuk, took similar action to prevent its signing. In this case, one 
could say that these individuals did impact Ukrainian foreign policy by setting the public agenda 
and their financial means allowed them to do so. On the other hand, I have concluded that this is 
in fact not very surprising and that this constitutes regular lobbying practice similar to what one 
would find in other types of political systems. More significant are my findings when it comes to 
the lobbying of the negotiations around European integration, where there are indications that 
several oligarchs have used the peculiarities of the Ukrainian political system to influence policy 
making to their personal advantage: Thanks to the formal and informal access points to 
government some Ukrainian oligarchs had, for example by being members of parliament 
themselves or by having personal ties with policy makers, they had the opportunities to impact 
the negotiation process and there is preliminary evidence that they were in some cases successful 
in influencing it. Seeing as the process of European integration was a key topic of Ukrainian 
foreign policy, one can conclude that in this instance the position of oligarchs in Ukraine’s political 
system has in some cases facilitated their impact on foreign policy.

	 When one examines the role of oligarchs in the conflicts that emerged in Crimea and 
Eastern Ukraine, a mixed but similar picture emerges. In the Crimean case, I have found little 
evidence that oligarchs played a role in any of the proceedings except for taking legal action to 
reclaim their confiscated properties after the annexation. When it comes to Eastern Ukraine, 
however, I believe one can argue that oligarchs have played a significant role in the development 
of the conflict, facilitated by the position oligarchs take in Ukraine’s domestic structure. Their 
impact on the conflict is most notable in the cases of Akhmetov and Kolomoiskiy, as the former 
likely supported the separatist forces in the initial stages of the conflict and the latter used 
significant private means to fund the Ukrainian volunteer battalions, thereby shaping the course of 
the conflict and the course the Ukrainian government would take in it. I have argued that this is 
also typical for the role of oligarchs in the Ukrainian political system, because they have been able 
to influence the outcome of foreign policy outside of political structures by using their exceptional 
material means combined with their regional ties. Second, the influence of the oligarchs was 
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institutionalised when they were appointed important political positions. This gave Taruta, 
Kolomoiskiy and Medvedchuk notable access to formal policy making in concern to the conflict. 
Taruta and Kolomoiskiy were tasked with negotiating with the separatist forces, while 
Medvedchuk was promoted to mediator between the fighting parties. Thus, in this case a number 
of oligarchs have been able to impact foreign policy because of their formal political positions.

	 All in all, on the basis of my findings I believe there is reason to suppose that the domestic 
structure in Ukraine, where oligarchs have emerged as important players on the political stage, 
has given them opportunities to influence events on the international level as well. I have argued 
that the political system that has developed in the country gives oligarchs the access points to 
impact foreign policy in several important ways: Their informal as well as formal connections give 
them access to the decision making process and this helps them to influence policy, domestic as 
well as foreign. Moreover, as shown by the Eastern Ukraine case, oligarchs can also eﬀectively 
impact foreign and domestic policy directly by using their significant wealth. So what does this 
mean for the general theory on business elites and politics in foreign policy formulation? My 
findings in terms of the role of Ukrainian oligarchs in decision making broadly correspond with 
what Grossman and Helpman wrote about the influence of business groups on foreign policy in 
the United States. They described how business elites are able to win the favour of politicians and 
steer policy their way by using their financial means. Oligarchs in Ukraine indeed use their 
financial means to steer policy and strive to win the favour of politicians. But my main contribution 
to their theory and theory on big business and foreign policy in general, is that I have illustrated 
how in a non-consolidated democracy like Ukraine, business elites can also have access to 
formal and informal political channels to complement their financial means in order to influence 
foreign policy. This mechanism then is also in accordance with the way David Lewis described the 
functioning of a neopatrimonial democracy: Institutions of the modern state are combined with 
informal behind-the-scenes politicking. In this regard, I have contributed to the existing 
scholarship by showing how this functioning can not only have consequences for domestic policy, 
the area scholars of neopatrimonialism in Ukraine have so far predominantly focused on, but for 
foreign policy as well.

	 Still, as I have indicated earlier, based on my research it would not be possible to give a 
definitive qualification of the extent of the influence of oligarchs on Ukrainian foreign policy. 
Quantitative data as was used by Jacobs and Page in their research would be needed, as well as 
more comprehensive qualitative investigation into the informal political activities of oligarchs. As I 
conceded before, the nature of the topic has made the collection of data for this project 
challenging and my research was limited by time and scope. I have only dealt with a select group 
of prominent oligarchs, while excluding others. The role of Petro Poroshenko for example, himself 
oligarch and since 2014 president of Ukraine, would also deserve to be examined more closely. 
Thus, my findings should be considered indicative and not conclusive. One could also object that 
I have been too selective with my cases and indeed future research should involve more foreign 
policy events in order to make a stronger case. Nevertheless, in this respect my expectation is 
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that when one would include more events preceding 2010, oligarchic influence in foreign policy as 
a result of Ukraine’s domestic structure will likely rather be more apparent than less. One can for 
example consider Ukraine’s main subject of pre-2010 Ukrainian foreign policy; energy politics. It 
follows from past research that oligarchs like Dmitro Firtash and Yulia Timoshenko were decisive 
in determining Ukraine’s approach to the gas trade by making use of their political positions and 
personal contacts (see Balmaceda, 2013: 115-135, Kuzio, 2015: 394-408). Consequently, this 
would correspond with my findings with regard to the 2010-2014 events.
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